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Abstract
The shuffle model of differential privacy [Bittau et al. SOSP 2017; Erlingsson et al. SODA
2019; Cheu et al. EUROCRYPT 2019] was proposed as a viable model for performing distributed
differentially private computations. Informally, the model consists of an untrusted analyzer that
receives messages sent by participating parties via a shuffle functionality, the latter potentially
disassociates messages from their senders. Prior work focused on one-round differentially private
shuffle model protocols, demonstrating that functionalities such as addition and histograms can
be performed in this model with accuracy levels similar to that of the curator model of differential
privacy, where the computation is performed by a fully trusted party. A model closely related to
the shuffle model was presented in the seminal work of Ishai et al. on establishing cryptography
from anonymous communication [FOCS 2006].
Focusing on the round complexity of the shuffle model, we ask in this work what can be
computed in the shuffle model of differential privacy with two rounds. Ishai et al. showed how
to use one round of the shuffle to establish secret keys between every two parties. Using this
primitive to simulate a general secure multi-party protocol increases its round complexity by
one. We show how two parties can use one round of the shuffle to send secret messages without
having to first establish a secret key, hence retaining round complexity. Combining this primitive
with the two-round semi-honest protocol of Applebaun, Brakerski, and Tsabary [TCC 2018],
we obtain that every randomized functionality can be computed in the shuffle model with an
honest majority, in merely two rounds. This includes any differentially private computation.
We hence move to examine differentially private computations in the shuffle model that (i) do
not require the assumption of an honest majority, or (ii) do not admit one-round protocols, even
with an honest majority. For that, we introduce two computational tasks: common element,
and nested common element with parameter α. For the common element problem we show that
for large enough input domains, no one-round differentially private shuffle protocol exists with
constant message complexity and negligible δ, whereas a two-round protocol exists where every
party sends a single message in every round. For the nested common element we show that no
one-round differentially private protocol exists for this problem with adversarial coalition size
αn. However, we show that it can be privately computed in two rounds against coalitions of size
cn for every c < 1. This yields a separation between one-round and two-round protocols. We
further show a one-round protocol for the nested common element problem that is differentially
private with coalitions of size smaller than cn for all 0 < c < α < 1/2.
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1 Introduction
A recent line of work in differential privacy focuses on a distributed model where parties commu-
nicate with an analyzer via a random shuffle. The shuffle collects messages from the participating
parties and presents them to the analyzer in a random order, hence potentially disassociating be-
tween messages and their senders [11, 19, 14]. The hope is that the shuffle model would be useful for
the implementation of practical distributed differentially private statistical and machine learning
analyses, and with accuracy comparable to that of centralized differential privacy solutions. The
implementation of the shuffle itself is envisioned to be based on technologies such as secure enclaves,
mix nets, and secure computation.
The theoretical work on the shuffle model has so far focused on developing protocols for the
model formalized in [14]. In this synchronous one-round model, all the participating parties send
their messages through the shuffle at once (parties may send one message or multiple messages).
Already in this limited communication model there are fundamental statistical tasks for which
differentially private shuffle model protocols exist with error comparable to that achievable in the
(centralized) curator model of differential privacy [14, 5, 21, 4, 22, 6, 2, 23].
A model similar to the shuffle model was presented already in 2006 by Ishai, Kushilevits,
Ostrovsky, and Sahai in the context of secure multiparty computation [25]. In particular, Ishai et
al. presented a one-round secure summation protocol that has become one of the building blocks
of noise efficient real summation differentialy-private protocols, where each party holds a number
xi ∈ [0, 1] and the analyzer’s task is to estimate the sum
∑
xi [21, 4, 22, 6]. Ishai et al. also
presented a one-round protocol allowing any two parties to agree on a secret key, a step after which
the parties can privately exchange messages. Combining this primitive with general constructions
of secure multiparty computation protocols that rely on private or secure channels, Ishai et al.
showed that it is possible to compute any (finite) function of the parties’ joint inputs in a constant
number of rounds. In particular, we observe that combining the key agreement protocol of Ishai
et al. [25] with the recent two-round secure multiparty protocol of Applebaum, Brakersky, and
Tsabary [1] (denoted the ABT protocol), no more than three rounds suffice for computing any
(finite) randomized function securely in the shuffle model, with semi-honest parties assuming an
honest majority: one round for every pair of parties to setup a secret key, and hence private
communication channels. Two more round to simulate the ABT protocol using these private
channels. To conclude, the previous results imply that any randomized function (including, in
particular, any curator model differential privacy computation) can be computed in the shuffle
model with security against an honest majority.1
1.1 Our results
In this work, we focus on the shuffle model with semi-honest parties. We ask what can be computed
in the shuffle model with one and two rounds of communication, and at the presence of coalitions of
semi-honest parties that can put together their inputs, randomization, and messages they receive
during the computation with the goal of breaching the privacy of other parties. We present new
techniques for constructing round-efficient protocols in the shuffle models as well as new lowerbound
techniques for studying the limitations of one-round protocols. In more detail:
1Curator model computations returning real numbers, such as those resulting by adding Laplace or Gaussian
noise, would need to be carefully truncated to finite precision.
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One-round private message transmission. In Section 3.1 we present a new building block
for shuffle model protocols. This is a protocol that allows a party Pi to send a secret message to
another party Pj in one round. In the key agreement protocol of Ishai et al. [25], mentioned above,
to agree on a bit b of the key, each of Pi and Pj selects and sends through the shuffle a random
element chosen from a large set. Denoting the elements sent by Pi, Pj as x, y resp., parties Pi and
Pj can set the secret bit b to 0 if x < y and to 1 if x > y. (The protocol fails if x = y.) The other
parties cannot distinguish which of the two values is x and which is y and gain no information
about the bit b. Using this protocol, party Pi learns the secret key only after the conclusion of
one communication round, and only then can Pi use the key to encrypt a message. In contrast,
our construction saves a round in the communication, as it allows Pi to encrypt a message without
having to first establish a key.
Generic two-round secure multiparty computation for the shuffle model. Using the one-
round message transmission protocol, we show in Section 3.2 how to simulate the two-round semi-
honest secure multi-party computation protocol with information theoretic security of Applebaum
et al. [1].2 The result is a general construction in the shuffle model of two-round honest majority
protocols for the semi-honest setting, with information theoretic security. The construction is
efficient in the size of the formula representing the functionality.
Our generic two-round construction shows that the shuffle model is extremely expressive: no
more than two rounds suffice for computing any (finite) randomized function, including any curator
level differential privacy computation, with semi-honest parties assuming an honest majority of
players. We hence move to examine differentially private computations in the shuffle model that
(i) do not require the assumption of an honest majority, or (ii) do not admit one-round protocols,
even with an honest majority. To demonstrate our lowerbound and upperbound techniques, we
introduce two computational tasks:
Common element: Each of n parties holds an input xi taken from a large finite domain X . The
parties communicate with an analyzer via the shuffle. If all the parties hold the same input x ∈ X
then the analyzer’s task is to output x. Otherwise, the analyzer’s outcome is not restricted.
Nested common element with parameter α: This is a variant of the common element problem,
where parties P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋ each holds an input xi ∈ X . The other parties P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn each
holds a vector of |X | elements taken from some finite domain Y, i.e., yi ∈ Y |X |. The parties
communicate with an analyzer via the shuffle. If all the parties of the first type hold the same
input x ∈ X and all the vectors held by parties of the second type have the same value z in
their x-th entry, then the analyzer’s task is to output z (otherwise, the analyzer’s outcome is not
restricted). We consider the case where |X | is polynomial in n, thus, the size of the inputs is
polynomial in n even when |Y| is exponential in n.
Both tasks need to be performed with differential privacy, assuming semi-honest parties. We
now describe the bounds we prove for these problems:
A lowerbound on one-round shuffle model protocols for the common element problem.
In Section 4.1 we present a new lowerbound technique for one-round shuffle model protocols where
the mutual information between input and output is high. Unlike other lowerbounds in the shuffle
model of differential privacy that we are aware of, our lowerbound proof works for the multi-message
2 An alternative construction was given by Garg et al. [20]; the communication complexity of their protocol is
exponential in the number of parties.
2
setting, and does not require all parties to use the same randomizer.3
For the common element problem, we show a relationship between the message complexity ℓ,
the input domain size |X |, and the privacy parameters ε and δ. In particular, for constant ε and
negligible δ, our bound yields that for constant number of messages ℓ and domain size |X | > 2nO(ℓ)
the common element problem does not admit a one-round shuffle model protocol. At the heart
of the lowerbound proof is a transformation from a shuffle model protocol into a local differential
privacy randomizer, for which bounds on the mutual information between the input and output
are known (see, e.g., [27]).
The one-round lowerbound is contrasted in Section 4.2 with a two-round protocol for the com-
mon element problem where each party sends a single message in each round. In this protocol, the
parties need to communicate through the shuffle in only one of the rounds (and can either use the
shuffle or a public channel in the other round).
An impossibility result for the nested common element problem. In Section 5.1 we show
(for large enough X , i.e., |X | = Ω˜(n2)) that, regardless of the number of messages sent by each
party, no one-round shuffle protocol exists for the problem that is secure against coalitions of αn
semi-honest parties, even when the domain Y is binary. We observe that for every c < 1 the
nested common element problem has a 2-round private protocol secure against a coalition of size
cn. This gives a separation between what can be computed with coalitions of size up to αn in one-
and two-round shuffle model protocols. Intuitively, the lowerbound follows from the fact that after
seeing the shuffle outcome, a coalition covering P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋ can simulate the protocol’s execution
for any possible value x ∈ X and hence learn all vector entries on which the inputs of parties
P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn agree. When Y is binary, Bun et al. [13] have used fingerprinting codes to show
that this task is impossible when the dimension of the vectors is Ω˜(n2), even in the curator model
of differential privacy (in the setting of the nested common element the dimension corresponds to
|X |).4
A one-round protocol for the nested common element problem. A natural approach to
solve the nested common element problem in two rounds is to execute a (one-round) protocol for
the common element problem among parties P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋, then, if a common element x is found,
repeat the protocol with parties P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn ignoring all but the x-th entry of their vectors. It
may seem that any shuffle model protocol for the problem should require more than one round. In
Section 5.2 we show that this is not the case. In fact, there is a one-round protocol that tightly
matches the above impossibility result for α ≤ 1/2. For all c < min {α, 1 − α} there exist one-round
shuffle model protocols for the nested common element problem that are secure in the presence of
coalitions of size up to cn.
1.2 Other related work
Private protocols for the common element problem in the shuffle model are implied by protocols for
histograms [14, 21, 2]. Specifically, for all c < 1, one-round shuffle model protocols for the common
element problem that are secure in the presence of coalitions of size up to cn (provided that
n = Ω( 1
ε2
log 1δ )) are implied by the protocols of Balcer and Cheu [2]. While they only considered
privacy given the view of the analyzer, their protocols are secure against coalitions containing a
constant fraction of the parties.
3Two exceptions are the recent works of Balcer et al. [3] and Cheu and Ullman [15], mentioned in Section 1.2.
4Bun et al. [13] have considered a related problem, however their technique applies also to this task.
3
Lowerbounds on the error level achievable in the one-round single message shuffle model for
the problems of frequency estimation and selection were provided by Ghazi et al. [21]. Robustness
against adversarial behaviour in the shuffle model was informally discussed by Balle et al. [6], when
discussing the effect malicious parties can have on the accuracy guarantees in their protocols for
addition of real numbers.
Closest to our interest are the recent lowerbounds by Balcer et al. [3]. They define robustly
shuffle private one-round protocols, where privacy guarantees are required to hold if at least γn
parties participate in the protocol. The other malicious parties avoid sending messages to the
shuffle. While this model is equivalent to ours in the one-round setting, the lowerbound techniques
in [3] are different from ours. In particular, they forge an interesting relationships between online
pan-privacy [18] and robustly shuffle private one-round protocols and hence can use lowerbounds
from pan-privacy to deduce lowerbounds for robustly shuffle private one-round protocols. Specif-
ically, for estimating the number of distinct elements they prove that the additive error grows as
Θε(
√
k), and for uniformity testing they prove that the sample complexity grows as Θ˜ε,δ(k
2/3). In
both cases k is the domain size. (These bounds also hold in our model.) As with our bounds, the
lowerbounds by Balcer et al. hold in the case where different parties may use different randomizers,
and send multiple messages.
Independent and parallel to our work, Cheu and Ullman [15] presented exponential separations
between the 1-round shuffle model and the (centralized) curator model of differential privacy. In
particular, they showed that every 1-round shuffle model protocol for private agnostic learning of
parity functions over d bits requires Ω(2d/2) samples, while O(d) samples suffice in the curator
model. Our work shows, in particular, that private agnostic learning of parity functions using O(d)
samples can be done in the shuffle model in two rounds (with semi-honest parties assuming an
honest majority). Hence, combined with our work, the results of [15] provide additional separations
between one-round and two-round shuffle model protocols.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The communication model
Let X be a data domain and let M be an arbitrary message domain (w.l.o.g., ⊥ ∈ X ,M). We
consider a model where the inputs and the computation are distributed among n parties P1, . . . , Pn
executing a protocol Π = (R¯, S), where R¯ = (R1, . . . , Rn) are n stateful randomized functionalities
and S is a stateless channel that acts either as a shuffle functionality or as a public channel. See
Figure 1 for a formal description of protocols in the shuffle model.
Definition 2.1. Consider an execution of a protocol in the shuffle model as described in Figure 1.
The message complexity of Π is ℓ, the number of messages that each party sends to the shuffle
in each round. The round complexity of Π is r. The shuffle complexity of Π is the number of
rounds where S is used as a shuffle.
Remark 2.2. A protocol that uses a public random string w can always be converted into a protocol
that does not use a public random string, at the cost of one additional communication round in
which party P1 sends the string w (in the semi-honest setting). This additional communication
round can be thought of as an “offline” round, as it is independent of the inputs and the function.
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Execution of a protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), S) in the shuffle model
Initialization:
• All parties receive a public random string w ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Each party Pi receives its input xi ∈ X and initializes the execution of Ri(w, xi).
Communication rounds 1 ≤ j ≤ r:
1. If round j uses S as a shuffle:
(a) Each party Pi invokes Ri to generate ℓ messages (mi,j [1], . . . ,mi,j [ℓ]) ∈ Mℓ and
sends (mi,j [1], . . . ,mi,j [ℓ]) ∈Mℓ to S.
(b) Let (mˆ1, . . . , mˆnℓ) = (m1,j [1], . . . ,m1,j[ℓ], . . . ,mn,j [1], . . . ,mn,j [ℓ]) be the nℓ
messages received by S.
(c) S chooses a permutation π : [nℓ]→ [nℓ] uniformly at random.
(d) S outputs sj = (mˆπ(1), . . . , mˆπ(nℓ)) to all parties.
2. Otherwise (round j uses S as a public channel):
(a) Each party Pi invokes Ri to generate a (single) message mi,j ∈ M, which it
sends to S.
(b) S outputs sj = (m1,j , . . . ,mn,j).
3. Pi feeds sj to Ri.
Output: Each party Pi invokes Ri to obtain its local output oi.
Figure 1: The communication model.
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2.2 Differentially private shuffle model protocols
Definition 2.3. We say that input vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n and x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ X n are
i-neighboring if they differ on exactly the i-th entry. We say that x and x′ are neighboring if there
exists an index i such that they are i-neighboring.
Definition 2.4. We say that two probability distributions D0,D1 ∈ ∆(Ω) are (ε, δ)-close and write
D0 ≈ε,δ D1 if for all events T ⊂ Ω and for b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
t∼Db
[t ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr
t∼D1−b
[t ∈ T ] + δ.
Definition 2.5 (Differential privacy [17, 16]). An algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for
all neighboring x,x′ we have that A(x) ≈ε,δ A(x′).
We are now ready to define what it means for a protocol to be differentially private in the
(semi-honest) shuffle model. Intuitively, this means that the view of every coalition C of up to t
parties cannot depend too strongly on the input of a party Pi 6∈ C. More formally,
Definition 2.6 (View in shuffle model). The view of a coalition C on input x in protocol Π,
denoted ViewΠC (x), is the random variable consisting of the public randomness w, the inputs and
local randomness of the parties in C, and the output of the r rounds of Π when executed on x, i.e.,
s1, . . . , sr.
Definition 2.7 (Multiparty semi-honest differential privacy [10, 27]). A protocol Π is (ε, δ)-
differentially private against coalitions of size t if for all i ∈ [n], for all coalitions C of t parties s.t.
Pi 6∈ C, and for all i-neighboring x,x′,
ViewΠC (x) ≈ε,δ ViewΠC (x′).
Observe that if a protocol is differentially private against coalitions of size t as in the definition
above, then it also the case that ViewΠC (x) ≈ε,δ ViewΠC (x′) for all coalitions C of size less than t.
Remark 2.8.
1. The shuffle functionality S. It is not essential that the shuffle functionality S be random-
ized. The shuffle output s in Step (1d) of Protocol Π in Figure 1 can be replaced with any
canonical representation of the multiset {mˆ1, . . . , mˆnℓ} (e.g., in lexicographic order) without
affecting any of our results.
2. Hybrid-shuffle model. The shuffle model can equivalently be thought of as a hybrid model,
where all parties have access to a shuffle functionality.
3. The local randomizers Ri. In deviation from most of prior work on the shuffle model, the
randomizers R1, . . . , Rn need not be identical. In particular, the execution of Ri may depend
on the identity i of player Pi.
4. Local model protocols. An (ε, δ)-differentially private protocol Π with zero shuffle com-
plexity satisfies local differential privacy [26, 27].
5. Shuffle model with an analyzer. In prior work on the shuffle model one party, A,
is an analyzer. The analyzer has no input (xA = ⊥) and does not send messages, i.e.,
(mA,j[1], . . . ,mA,j[ℓ]) = ⊥ℓ for 1 ≤ j ≤ r. In this setting the local output of parties P1, . . . , Pn
is ⊥ and the outcome of the protocol is the local output of A. Sections 4 and 5 consider the
shuffle model with an analyzer.
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2.3 Secure computation protocols with semi-honest parties
Let f : X n → Yn be a randomized functionality. We recall the definition from the cryptographic
literature of what it means that a protocol Π securely computes f(x1, . . . , xn) with semi-honest
parties. We will use this definition both in the shuffle model and in the setting where the parties
communicate over a complete network of private channels. For the latter we define the view of a
coalition as follows:
Definition 2.9 (View in complete network of private channels). The view of a coalition C on
input x in protocol Π, denoted viewπC(x), is the random variable consisting of the inputs and local
randomness of the parties in C and the messages the parties in C receive from the parties in C =
{P1, . . . , Pn} \ C.
Definition 2.10 (Secure computation in the semi-honest model). A protocol Π is said to δ-
securely compute f with coalitions of size at most t if there exists a simulator SimΠ such that for
any coalition C of at most t parties and every input vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n,(
SimΠ(C,x[C],y[C]),y[C]) ≈0,δ (ViewΠC (x),Output(C)) ,
where y = f(x) and Output(C) is the output of the parties in C in the protocol. The probability
distribution on the left is over the randomness of f and the randomness of the simulator, and the
probability distribution on the right is over the randomness of the honest parties and the adversary.
When δ = 0 we say that Π provides perfect privacy.
Remark 2.11. In the shuffle model, ViewΠC (x) also includes the public random string w (if exists),
and the probability distribution on the right in Definition 2.10 is also over the public random string.
We next state a composition theorem for differentially private protocols using secure protocols.
Lemma 2.12. Let Π be a protocol with one invocation of a black-box access to some function f
(the f -hybrid model). Let Πf be a protocol that δ
′-securely computes f with coalitions of size up
to t. Let Π′ be as in Π, except that the call to f is replaced with the execution of Πf . If Π is
(ε, δ)-differentially private with coalitions of size up to t, then Π′ is (ε, (eε+1) · δ′+ δ)-differentially
private with coalitions of size up to t.
Proof. Consider a coalition C of up to t parties. The random variable ViewΠ′C (x) consisting the
view of coalition C in an execution of protocol Π′ can be parsed into the view of C in protocol
Π, i.e., ViewΠC (x), and the view of C in the execution of protocol Πf , i.e., ViewΠfC (y). In the
latter y is the input to f in the execution of Π on input x (similarly, we will use y′ to denote the
input to f in the execution of Π on input x′). Note that, by Definition 2.10, View
Πf
C (y) can be
simulated as SimΠf (C,y[C], fC(y)) up to statistical distance δ′. Observe that ViewΠC contains the
inputs yC sent to f as well as the outcome seen by the coalition, fC(y). Hence, Sim
Πf (C,y[C], fC(y))
is a post-processing of ViewΠC (x). To emphasize this fact, we write Sim
Πf (ViewΠC (x)) instead of
SimΠf (C,y[C], fC(y)).
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Let Pi 6∈ C. For all i-neighboring x,x′ and all T we have that
Pr[ViewΠ
′
C (x) ∈ T ] = Pr[(ViewΠC (x),ViewΠfC (y)) ∈ T ]
≤ Pr[(ViewΠC (x),SimΠf (ViewΠC (x))) ∈ T ] + δ′ (Definition 2.10)
≤ eε · Pr[(ViewΠC (x′),SimΠf (ViewΠC (x′))) ∈ T ] + δ + δ′ Π is (ε, δ)-DP)
≤ eε · (Pr[(ViewΠC (x′),ViewΠfC (y′)) ∈ T ] + δ′) + δ + δ′ (Definition 2.10)
= eε · Pr[ViewΠ′C (x′) ∈ T ] + (eε + 1)δ′ + δ.
The second step in the analysis follows from the fact that differential privacy is preserved under
post-processing.
2.4 Pairwise independent hash functions
In our constructions We use pair pairwise independent hash functions, defined below.
Definition 2.13 (Pairwise independent hash functions). A family H = {h : X → R} is said to be
pairwise independent, if for any two distinct elements x1 6= x2 ∈ X , and any two (possibly equal)
values y1, y2 ∈ R,
Pr
h∈H
[h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2] = 1|R|2 ,
where h is chosen with uniform distribution from H independently of x1, x2.
In particular, if H is a pairwise independent family, then for every x1 6= x2 ∈ X it holds that
Prh∈H [h(x1) = h(x2)] =
1
|R| , and for every set A ⊆ X we have Prh∈H [∃x1 6=x2∈A h(x1) = h(x2)] ≤
|A|2
|R| , in this case we say that A is perfectly hashed by h.
3 A Two-Round Secure MPC Protocol in the Shuffle Model
In this section we show that every functionality that can be computed with differential privacy
in the centralized model can be computed with differential privacy in the shuffle model in two
rounds assuming an honest majority. To achieve this result we first show a one-round protocol in
the shuffle model for secure message transmission, that is, we show that how to emulate a private
channel. This result together with an honest-majority two-round MPC protocol of [1] in the private
channel model imply that every functionality (including differentially-private functionalities) can
be securely computed in the shuffle model in two rounds assuming an honest majority.
3.1 A one-round secure message transmission protocol
Assume that party Pi wants to send a message to party Pj using the shuffle such that any other
party will not learn any information on the message. In [25] this was done in two rounds. In the
first round Pi and Pj agree on a secret key, and in the second round Pi encrypts the message using
this key as a one-time pad. We present a protocol such that Pi knows the key in advance and can
encrypt the message already in the first round. The resulting protocol has statistical security.
We start by describing a variant of the protocol of [25] for key exchange. As a first step, we
describe a key exchange protocol in which Pi and Pj agree with probability 1/2 on a random bit
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(and with probability 1/2 the output is “FAIL”). The protocol is as follows: Party Pi samples a
uniformly distributed bit a and sends to the shuffle the message (i, j, a). Similarly, party Pj samples
a uniformly distributed bit b and sends to the shuffle the message (i, j, b).5 If a = b the protocol
fails. Otherwise, the joint key is a. As both parties Pi, Pj get the output of the shuffle, they both
know if the protocol fails (a = b) or not, and if the protocol does not fail (a 6= b) they both know
a – the common key. On the other hand, an adversary that sees the output of the shuffle when
a 6= b, sees a shuffle of the two messages {(i, j, 0), (i, j, 1)} and does not get any information on
a. To generate a k-bit key, the above protocol is repeated 3k times in parallel with independent
random bits aℓ, bℓ in each execution, and the shared key is the bits of Pi in the first k indices where
aℓ 6= bℓ. By a simple Chernoff-Hoefding bound, the probability that there are no such k indices is
exponentially small. See Figure 2 for a formal description of the protocol.
Protocol KeyExchange
Inputs: Pi and Pj hold a security parameter 1
k.
1. Pi samples 3k uniformly distributed bits (a1, . . . , a3k) and sends to the shuffle 3k
messages (i, j, 1, a1), . . . , (i, j, 3k, a3k).
2. Pj samples 3k uniformly distributed bits (b1, . . . , b3k) and sends to the shuffle 3k
messages (i, j, 1, b1), . . . , (i, j, 3k, b3k).
3. The shuffle publishes a random permutation of the messages it got.
4. Let ℓ1 < ℓ2 < · · · < ℓk be the first k indices such that aℓj 6= bℓj (if there are no such
k indices, output “FAIL”). The joint key is (aℓ1 , aℓ2 , . . . , aℓk).
Figure 2: A one-round key exchange protocol.
To construct a one-round protocol for secure message transmission from Pi to Pj , we want Pi
to know the key in advance so it can use the key to encrypt the message at the same time it sends
the messages for the key exchange. In Protocol KeyExchange, party Pi does not know the key in
advance since it does not know the bits that (a1, . . . , a3k) and (b1, . . . , b3k) disagree. To overcome
this problem Pi will use all the bits it generates as a pre-key K. In this case Pj will know all bits of
the pre-key K whereas an adversary will learn only about half of the bits of K. Parties Pi and Pj
wish to agree on a key generated from the pre-key K without interaction such that the adversary
gets negligible information about the agreed key. This is an instance of the privacy amplification
problem and a simple solution is to sample a pairwise independent hash function h and set the key
as h(K). It follows by the left-over hash lemma [24] that h(K) is close to uniform given h and the
knowledge of the adversary about the pre-key K.
Theorem 3.1 (The left-over hash lemma [24]). Let m,n be integers and X be a random variable
distributed over {0, 1}n such that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−m for every x ∈ {0, 1}n. Let H be a family of
pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m−2k. Then, for a random h uniformly
distributed in H and independent of X,
SD ((h(X), h), (U, h)) ≤ 2−k,
5 We add the prefix i, j to the messages sent by Pi and Pj to enable all pairs of parties to exchange keys in parallel.
It is essential that both Pi and Pj list the identities i, j in the same order (e.g., lexicographic order).
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where U is uniform over {0, 1}m−2k and independent of h, and where SD denotes the statistical
distance (total variation distance).
Protocol SecureMessageTransmission
Inputs: Party Pi holds a security parameter 1
k and a messageM of length at most k, party
Pj holds security parameter 1
k.
1. Pi samples 7k uniformly distributed bits (a1, . . . , a7k) and sends to the shuffle 7k
messages (i, j, 1, a1), . . . , (i, j, 7k, a7k).
2. Pj samples 7k uniformly distributed bits (b1, . . . , b7k) and sends to the shuffle 7k
messages (i, j, 1, b1), . . . , (i, j, 7k, b7k).
3. Pi samples a function h uniformly at random from a family of pairwise indepen-
dent functions H =
{
h : {0, 1}7k → {0, 1}k
}
and sends to the shuffle the message
(i, j, “message”, h, h(a1, . . . , a7k)⊕M).
4. The shuffle publishes a random permutation of the messages it got.
Figure 3: A one-round protocol for secure message transmission.
Theorem 3.2. Protocol SecureMessageTransmission is a correct and secure protocol for mes-
sage transmission, that is (1) Pj can always recover M , (2) For every two messages M,M
′ the
statistical distance between the views of the referee and all parties except for Pi and Pj in an
executions of Protocol SecureMessageTransmission with M and Protocol SecureMessage-
Transmission with M ′ is at most 3 · 2−k.
Proof. For the correctness of the protocol, as Pj knows its messages, it can deduce for every ℓ the
message (i, j, ℓ, aℓ) sent by Pi, hence compute the common key h(a1, . . . , a7k) and compute M .
For the security of the protocol, first note that by a Chernoff-Hoefding bound, the probability
that there are less than 3k indices ℓ such that aℓ 6= bℓ is less than 2−k, and such executions add
at most 2−k to the statistical distance. We continue the analysis assuming that such event did not
occur.
We consider an execution of Protocol SecureMessageTransmission in which is Step (3)
party Pi sends the message (i, j, “message”, h, u ⊕M) for a uniformly sampled u ∈ {0, 1}k. In
this case, the executions for M and M ′ are equally distributed (as u acts as a one-time pad).
To prove the security it suffices to prove that for every message M , the statistical distance in
the view in the executions of Protocol SecureMessageTransmission and the modified Protocol
SecureMessageTransmission (both with M) is at most 2−k. Fix a set L ⊂ [7k] of size at least
3k, and consider all executions in which aℓ 6= bℓ if and only if ℓ ∈ L. For every index ℓ ∈ L, the view
discloses no information on aℓ in these executions (since an adversary sees a random shuffle of the
two messages (i, j, ℓ, 0), (i, j, ℓ, 1) and does not get any information on aℓ). In other words, there are
at least 23k strings (a1, . . . , a7k) possible given the executions are consistent with L, and all strings
are equiprobable. Thus, by Theorem 3.1, the statistical distance between u and h(a1, . . . , a7k) is at
most 2−k. This completes the proof of security.
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3.2 A two round MPC protocol
We construct a two-round MPC protocol in the shuffle model for every functionality on inputs from
a finite domain assuming an honest majority. The construction is via a combination of the two-
round MPC protocol of Applebaum, Brakersky, and Tsabary [1] (Henceforth, Protocol ABT, see
Theorem 3.3 below), which assumes private channels between every pair of parties, with Protocol
SecureMessageTransmission executed in the shuffle model. The latter is used for simulating
the private channels.
Theorem 3.3 (Protocol ABT [1, Theorem 1.1]). At the presence of honest majority, any function
f can be computed with perfect privacy in a complete network of private channels in two rounds
with polynomial efficiency in the number of parties and in the size of the formula that computes f .
Theorem 3.4. Let f : X n → {0, 1} be a function and γ > 0 (γ can depend on n and f). At the
presence of honest majority, any function f can be computed with γ-statistical privacy in the shuffle
model in two rounds with polynomial efficiency in the number of parties, in the size of the formula
that computes f , and in log 1/γ.
Proof. In Figure 4, we describe Protocol MPCinShuffle – the two round MPC protocol in the
shuffle model.
Protocol MPCinShuffle
Protocol MPCinShuffle simulates (in the shuffle model) Protocol ABT of Theorem 3.3:
• In each of the two rounds of Protocol ABT:
– For each i, j ∈ [n]:
∗ Party Pi prepares the message that it would send to party Pj in Protocol
ABT.
∗ Pi and Pj execute Protocol SecureMessageTransmission with this mes-
sage and security parameter 1k.
/* In each round, all n(n−1) secure message transmission protocols are executed
in parallel and using the same shuffle */
• At the end of the protocol, each party computes the output of f from the simulated
messages of Protocol ABT.
Figure 4: A two-round MPC protocol in the shuffle model for arbitrary functionalities.
As Protocol SecureMessageTransmission has perfect correctness, each party in Protocol
MPCinShuffle can compute the messages it gets in Protocol ABT and compute f without any
error.
For the security of the protocol, let C be a coalition of less than n/2 parties. We construct a
simulator that generates a view for C that is O(n22−k) far from the view of C in the real-world
execution of Protocol MPCinShuffle:
• Execute the simulator of Protocol ABT of Theorem 3.3 and generate a view for C that is
identically distributed as the real view of C in Protocol ABT.
• For each round and for each pair Pi, Pj :
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– If at least one of Pi, Pj is in C then let Mi,j be the message that Pi sends to Pj in the
simulated view.
– Otherwise, let Mi,j be some fixed arbitrary message.
– Execute Protocol SecureMessageTransmission with the message Mi,j and generate
the messages that Pi, Pj send to the shuffle.
• For each round, shuffle the messages generated by Pi, Pj for every i, j ∈ [n].
• Output: The shuffled messages of round 1 and the shuffled messages of round 2, the ran-
domness of every Pi generated by the simulator of Protocol ABT, and the randomness used
by every Pi ∈ C in an execution of Protocol SecureMessageTransmission for which Pi is
either the sender or the receiver.
By Theorem 3.2, for every Pi, Pj /∈ C, the messages generated in the simulation (i.e., the
messages of Protocol SecureMessageTransmission for the fixed message Mi,j and the message
that Pi and Pj send to the shuffle in the real world for the real message of the Protocol ABT of
Theorem 3.3 are only O(2−k) far. Thus, the output of the simulator we constructed is at most
O(n2−k) far from the view of C in the real execution of Protocol MPCinShuffle.
Remark 3.5.
1. In Protocol SecureMessageTransmission we use the shuffle in both rounds as we execute
Protocol SecureMessageTransmission in each round. We can optimize the protocol and
only use the shuffle in the first round. To achieve this, in the first round each ordered pair of
parties Pi, Pj also executes Protocol KeyExchange in round 1 and generate a key, which is
used by Pi to encrypt the message that it send to Pj in round 2. The encrypted messages is
sent on the public channel.
2. In a setting with an analyzer as in Remark 2.8, the protocol can be simplified, with the
expense that we now need to assume that the number of colluding parties in P1, . . . , Pn is
less than (n− 1)/2. We execute Protocol ABT with n+1 parties, where the (n+1)-th party
(i.e., the analyzer) has no input and is the only party that receives an output. Furthermore,
we assume that the analyzer is always in the coalition, and, therefore, the messages that it
sends and receives are public. As the analyzer cannot send messages to the shuffle, we use
the public random string as the random string of the analyzer and the messages that the
input-less analyzer sends in the first round to party Pj in Protocol ABT are generated by
Pj without interaction using the random common string. Furthermore, in the second round
each party only sends its message to the analyzer and this message is sent in the clear.
3. In Protocol SecureMessageTransmission the shuffle receives O(k) messages and shuffles
them. We actually only need to shuffle every pair of messages (i, j, ℓ, aℓ), (i, j, ℓ, bℓ), thus, we
can use many copies of 2-message shuffle. The same is true for Protocol MPCinShuffle.
Corollary 3.6. Let f be an (ε, δ)-differentially private functional (in the centralized model) acting
on inputs from a finite domain and using a finite number of random bits and γ > 0. At the presence
of honest majority, the functionality f can be computed with (ε, δ + (eε + 1)γ)-differential privacy
in the shuffle model in two rounds with polynomial efficiency in the number of parties, in the size
of the formula that computes f , and in log 1/γ.
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Proof. We use Protocol MPCinShuffle to compute the function f . By Lemma 2.12 the resulting
protocol is private.
4 The Common Element Problem
In this section we study the following problem.
Definition 4.1 (The common element problem). In the common element problem, there are n
parties P1, . . . , Pn, where each party Pi gets an input xi ∈ X , and there is an analyzer P0 (with
no input). If all inputs are equal, i.e., x1 = x2 = · · · = xn, then with probability at least 3/4 the
analyzer must output x1 at the end of the execution. The outcome is not restricted otherwise.
4.1 An impossibility result for single-round constant-message protocols
We present an impossibility result for 1-round protocols for the common element problem. Infor-
mally, we show that if the domain size |X | is large, then either the number of messages ℓ must be
large, or else the privacy parameter δ must be “large”. Before we state and prove this impossibility
result, we introduce the following bound on the mutual information between the input of a party
in a 1-round differentially protocol and the messages she submits to the shuffle. This bound holds
for any 1-round differentially protocol (not only for protocols for the common element problem).
The results we use from information theory are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.2. Let Π be a 1-round shuffle model protocol for n parties satisfying (ε, δ)-differential
privacy for coalitions of size 1, with message complexity ℓ. Let X denote the input domain (i.e.,
the input of every party is an element of X ). Let (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ X n denote (possibly correlated)
random variables. Consider the execution of Π on inputs x1 = Z1, . . . xn = Zn, and for i ∈ [n] let
Yi denote the vector of messages submitted by party Pi to the shuffle, in lexicographic order. Also
let W be a random variable denoting the public randomness of the protocol. Then for every i ∈ [n],
if Zi is uniformly distributed over X then
I(Yi,W ;Zi) = O
(
(en)ℓ ·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log
ε
δ
)
+ ℓ · log (n)
)
.
In words, the theorem states that the mutual information between Zi (the input of party Pi),
and (Yi,W ) (the messages submitted by party Pi and the public randomness) is bounded.
Before proving Theorem 4.2, we quote two basic results from information theory (see Ap-
pendix A for the proofs of these lemmas, as well as additional preliminaries form information
theory). Consider three random variables Y1, Y2, Z, where Y1 and Y2 are conditionally independent
given Z. The following lemma shows that the amount of information that (Y1, Y2) give about Z, is
at most the amount that Y1 gives on Z plus the amount that Y2 gives on Z. (This is not necessarily
true without the conditionally independent assumption.)
Lemma 4.3. Let Y1, Y2, Z be random variables, where Y1 and Y2 are conditionally independent
given Z. Then, I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2) ≥ I(Z;Y1, Y2).
The following lemma shows that if I(X;Y |Z) is high and if H(Z) is low, then I(X;Y ) must
also be high. That is, if X gives a lot of information on Y when conditioning on a random variable
Z with low entropy, then X gives a lot of information on Y even without conditioning on Z.
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Lemma 4.4. Let X,Y,Z be three random variables. Then, I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Y |Z)−H(Z).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let R1, . . . , Rn denote the randomizers in the protocol Π, and fix i ∈ [n].
We use Π and i to construct the following algorithm, which we call LocalRandomizer, that gets a
single input xi and a public random string w.
1. Compute m˜i ← Ri(w, xi). That is, m˜i is the vector of ℓ messages chosen by Ri.
2. For j 6= i, sample xj ∈ X uniformly at random, and let m˜j ← Rj(w, xj).
3. For j ∈ [n], we write y˜j to denote m˜j after sorting it in lexicographic order.
4. Let s˜ be a random permutation of the collection of all messages in m˜1, . . . , m˜n.
5. Let y˜ denote a (sorted) vector of ℓ messages chosen randomly (without repetition) from s˜.
6. Return y˜, w.
Consider the execution of LocalRandomizer on a uniformly random input xi = Z˜ with the
public randomness W˜ . We will use Y˜ , S˜ and
{
M˜i
}
i∈[n]
{
Y˜i
}
i∈[n]
to denote the random variables
taking values y˜, s˜, {m˜i}i∈[n], and {y˜i}i∈[n] during the execution.
Observe that S˜ is identically distributed to the outcome of the shuffler in an execution of Π
on random inputs, and observe that the outcome of LocalRandomizer is computed as a post-
processing of S˜ and W˜ . Algorithm LocalRandomizer is, therefore, (ε, δ)-differentially private (as a
function of xi). Since the mutual information between the input and the output of a differentially
private algorithm is bounded (see, e.g., [8] or Theorem B.1), there exists a constant λ such that
I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
)
≤ λ ·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
. (1)
We now relate I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
)
to I
(
Y˜i, W˜ ; Z˜
)
. Intuitively, the connection is that with probability
≈ n−ℓ we get that Y˜ = Y˜i. Formally, let T be a random variable taking value 0 if Y˜ = Y˜i and
otherwise T = 1, and denote p = Pr[T = 0] = 1/
(
ℓn
ℓ
)
. By Lemma 4.4 and using standard bounds
on the entropy of a binary random variable (see, e.g., Claim A.3) we get that
I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
)
≥ I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
∣∣∣T)−H(T ) ≥ I ( Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜∣∣∣T)− p log(4
p
)
= E
t←T
[
I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
∣∣∣T = t)]− p log(4
p
)
≥ p · I
(
Y˜ , W˜ ; Z˜
∣∣∣T = 0)− p log(4
p
)
= p · I(Y˜i, W˜ ; Z˜)− p log
(
4
p
)
. (2)
So, combining Inequalities (1) and (2) we get that
I
(
Y˜i, W˜ ; Z˜
)
≤ λ
p
·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
+ log
(
4
p
)
≤ λ · (en)ℓ ·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
+ ℓ · log (4en) .
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Finally, observe that the input Z˜, the public randomness W˜ , and the (sorted) vectors of messages
Y˜i in the execution of LocalRandomizer are identically distributed to these variables in the exe-
cution of Π on inputs (Z1, . . . , Zn) with the public randomness W . That is, the random variables(
Y˜i, W˜ , Z˜
)
and (Yi,W,Zi) are identically distributed. Therefore,
I (Yi,W ;Zi) ≤ λ · (en)ℓ ·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
+ ℓ · log (4en) .
We next present our impossibility result for the common element problem.
Theorem 4.5. There exists a constant λ > 1 such that the following holds. Let ε ≤ 1, let ℓ ∈ N ,
and let X be such that |X | ≥ 2λ(4en)ℓ+1 . Let Π be a 1-round protocol for the common element
problem over the domain X with message complexity ℓ, such that Π is (ε, δ)-differentially private
for coalitions of size 1. Then,
δ = Ω
(
(en)−ℓ−1
)
.
Proof. We first give a short overview of the proof. Recall that if all inputs are equal to some element
x ∈ X , then the analyzer must output x with high probability. This also holds when the (common)
input x is chosen uniformly at random from X , which means that the mutual information between
the (common) input and the output of the analyzer must be high. We show that this means that
there must be at least one party Pi∗ such that mutual information between the random (common)
input and the messages submitted by Pi∗ must be high, which will contradict Theorem 4.2.
Let R1, . . . , Rn denote the randomizers in the protocol Π. Let Z be a uniformly random element
of X and consider the execution of Π on inputs x1 = x2 = · · · = xn = Z with a public random string
W . For i ∈ [n], let Mi denote a random variable representing the vector of ℓ messages submitted
to the shuffler by party Pi, and let Yi be the same as Mi after sorting it in lexicographic order. Let
S be a random variable denoting the outcome of the shuffler. That is, S is a random permutation
of all the messages in M1, . . . ,Mn. Alternatively, S is a random permutation of all the messages in
Y1, . . . , Yn. We use A for the random variable denoting the outcome of the analyzer at the end of
the execution.
Since A = Z with probability at least 3/4, the mutual information between A and Z must be
high. Specifically, Let B be a random variable taking value 0 if A = Z and otherwise B = 1. By
Lemma 4.4
I(A;Z) ≥ I(A;Z|B)−H(B) ≥ I(A;Z|B)− 1 = E
b←B
[
I(A;Z|B = b)
]
− 1
≥ 3
4
· I(A;Z|B = 0)− 1 = 3
4
· I(Z;Z)− 1 = 3
4
·H(Z)− 1 = 3
4
· log |X | − 1 ≥ 1
2
· log |X |.
Recall that A is a (possibly randomized) function of the outcome of the shuffle S and the public
randomness W . Hence, I(S,W ;Z) ≥ I(A;Z) ≥ 12 · log |X |. We now show that there must exist an
index i∗ ∈ [n] such that
I(Yi∗ ,W ;Z) ≥ 1
n
· I(S,W ;Z) ≥ 1
2n
· log |X |.
To that end, observe that since Π is a 1-round protocol, then conditioned on Z and on the public
randomness W we have that the messages that party Pi sends are independent of the messages
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that party Pj , where j 6= i, sends. That is, the random variables Y1, . . . , Yn are conditionally
independent given (Z,W ). Therefore, by Lemma 4.3 we have that∑
i∈[n]
I(Yi,W ;Z) =
∑
i∈[n]
(
I(W ;Z) + I(Yi;Z|W )
)
=
∑
i∈[n]
I(Yi;Z|W )
≥ I(Y1, . . . , Yn;Z|W )
≥ I(S;Z|W )
= I(S,W ;Z)− I(W ;Z)
= I(S,W ;Z)
≥ 1
2
· log |X |.
Hence, there must exist an index i∗ such that
I(Yi∗ ,W ;Z) ≥ 1
n
· I(S,W ;Z) ≥ 1
2n
· log |X |.
We are now ready to complete the proof. Observe that it suffices to prove the theorem assuming
that ε = 1 and that |X | = 2λ(4en)ℓ+1 . The reason is that any (ε, δ)-differentially private protocol
with ε ≤ 1 is also (1, δ)-differentially private, and that a protocol for the common element problem
over a domain X is, in particular, a protocol for the common element problem over subsets of
X . By Theorem 4.2 (our bound on the mutual information between the input and the messages
submitted by any single party in a 1-round protocol), there exists a constant λ > 1 such that
1
2n
· log |X | ≤ I(Yi∗ ,W ;Z) ≤ λ · (en)ℓ ·
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
+ ℓ · log (4en) .
Substituting ε = 1 and |X | = 2λ(4en)ℓ+1 , and solving for δ, we get that δ ≥ 1
8λ(en)ℓ+1
.
4.2 A two-round protocol with message complexity 1
Intuitively, Theorem 4.5 shows that in any 1-round protocol for the common element problem, we
either have that the message complexity is large, or we have that δ cannot be too small. In Figure 5
we present a two round protocol for the common element problem, in which the message complexity
is 1 and δ can be negligible. Our protocol, which we call Protocol CommonTwoRound, uses the
shuffle channel in only one of the two rounds, and the communication in the second round is done
via a public channel.
Theorem 4.6. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Protocol CommonTwoRound, described in Figure 5, is (O(1), O(δ))-
differentially private against coalitions of size 0.9n that solves the common element problem. The
protocol uses two rounds (one via a public channel and one via the shuffle) and has message com-
plexity 1.
We begin with the privacy analysis of Protocol CommonTwoRound.
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Protocol CommonTwoRound
Inputs: Each party Pi (for i ∈ [n]) holds an input xi ∈ X . The analyzer P0 has no input.
All parties have access to a hash function h : X → [n2/δ] chosen with uniform distribution
from a pairwise independent family (defined, e.g., using a public random string).
1. Every party Pi computes yi ← h(xi).
2. The parties use the public channel to execute a 1-round (ε, 0)-differentially pri-
vate protocol in the local model for histograms over the (distributed) database
Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) with failure probability δ (see e.g., [12], or Theorem B.2).
This results in a data structure D (known to all parties) that gives estimations
for the multiplicities of elements in Y . That is, for every y ∈ [n2/δ] we have that
D(y) ≈ |{i ∈ [n] : yi = y}|.
3. Let y∗ ∈ [n2/δ] be an element that maximizes D(y). If D(y) < 98·n100 then all parties
terminate, and the analyzer outputs ⊥.
4. Otherwise, each party Pi prepares a single message mi as follows:
(a) If yi 6= y∗ then mi = ⊥.
(b) Otherwise, mi = ⊥ with probability 1/2 and mi = xi with probability 1/2.
5. Each party Pi sends the message mi to the shuffle. All parties receive a permutation
s of (m1, . . . ,mn).
6. The analyzer outputs the element x∗ 6= ⊥ with the largest number of appearances in
s (the analyzer fails if all elements of s are equal to ⊥).
Figure 5: A two-round protocol in the shuffle model for the common element problem with message
complexity 1.
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Lemma 4.7. Protocol CommonTwoRound is (O(1), O(δ))-differentially private against coalitions
of size 0.9n.
Proof. Fix an index i ∈ [n], fix two i-neighboring input vectors x and x′, and fix a coalition C of
size |C| = 0.9n such that Pi /∈ C. We need to show that ViewΠC (x) ≈ε,δ ViewΠC (x′). First observe
that with probability at least 1− δ over the choice of the hash function h, we have that h perfectly
hashes all the different inputs in x,x′ (note x,x′ span at most n+1 different values). We proceed
with the analysis after fixing such a hash function h.
We write xC = x
′
C to denote the inputs of the parties in C, and fix the internal randomness rC
of the parties in C. Now let S1 and S2 be random variables representing the output of the public
channel and the shuffle, respectively, during the execution on x, where we denote S2 = ⊥ if the
execution halted on Step (3). Similarly, S′1, S
′
2 denote the outputs of these channels during the
execution on x′. With these notations we have that
ViewΠC (x) = (h, rC ,xC , S1, S2) and View
Π
C (x
′) =
(
h, rC ,xC , S
′
1, S
′
2
)
.
Observe that S1 and S
′
1 are computed using an (ε, 0)-differentially private protocol in the local
model (see Theorem B.2), and hence,
(h, rC ,xC , S1) ≈(ε,0)
(
h, rC ,xC , S
′
1
)
.
We next argue about S2 and S
′
2. For an element x ∈ X we write fx(x) to denote the number
of occurrences of x in the input vector x. Also, let x∗ ∈ X denote the most frequent element in x,
that is, an element such that fx(x
∗) is maximized.
Case (a) fx(x
∗) ≤ 96·n
100
: By the utility guarantees of the protocol for histograms (executed
on Step (2)), each of the two executions terminates in Step (3) with probability at least (1 − δ).
This is because if n = Ω( 1
ε2
log( 1εδ )) then with probability at least (1− δ) all of the estimates given
by D(·) are accurate to within ±0.01n (see Theorem B.2). Therefore, in case (a) we have
ViewΠC (x) = (h, rC ,xC , S1, S2) ≈(0,δ) (h, rC ,xC , S1,⊥)
≈(ε,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , S
′
1,⊥
) ≈(0,δ) (h, rC ,xC , S′1, S′2) = ViewΠC (x′).
Case (b) fx(x
∗) > 96·n
100
: Fix any value s1 for the outcome of the public channel, such that
all the estimates given by the resulting data structure D(·) are accurate to within ±0.01n w.r.t. x.
We first show that conditioned on such an s1 we have that
(h, rC ,xC , s1, S2) ≈(ε,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , s1, S
′
2
)
.
To see this, observe that once we condition on s1 then either both executions terminate on Step (3),
or in the two executions we have that y∗ = h(x∗) (because fx(x
∗) > 0.96n). If s1 is such that the
two executions terminate on Step (3), then (conditioned on s1) we have S2 = S
′
2 = ⊥ and so
(h, rC ,xC , s1, S2) ≡
(
h, rC ,xC , s1, S
′
2
)
.
Now suppose that the two executions do not halt prematurely, and that y∗ = h(x∗). In that case,
the outcome of the shuffle contains (randomly permuted) copies of ⊥ and copies of x∗. Note that
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since the outcome of the shuffle is randomly permuted, then the outcome distribution of the shuffle
is determined by the number of occurrences of x∗.
Note that if xi and x
′
i are both equal to x
∗, or are both different from x∗, then S2 and S
′
2 are
identically distributed, which would complete the proof. We, therefore, assume that exactly one of
xi, x
′
i is equal to x
∗. Suppose without loss of generality that xi = x
∗ and x′i 6= x∗.
Since fx(x
∗) > 0.96n and since |C| = 0.9n, there is a set of parties I of size |I| = 0.05n such
that
1. I ∩ (C ∪ {i}) = ∅.
2. For every j ∈ I we have that xj = x′j = x∗.
We show that the outcome of the shuffle preserves differential privacy (over the randomness of
the parties in I and the randomness of the shuffle). Fix the randomness of all parties except for
parties in I. Note that this fixes the messages that these parties submit to the shuffle, and suppose
that party Pi submits x
∗ during the first execution and submits ⊥ during the second execution
(if party Pi submits ⊥ during both execution then the outcome of the shuffle is, again, identically
distributed). Let k denote the number of parties among the parties not in I that submitted x∗ to
the shuffle during the execution on x. (So during the execution on x′ exactly k − 1 such parties
submitted x∗.)
Let us denote by Z the number of parties from I that submits x∗ to the shuffle. Note that
Z ≡ Binomial (|I|, 12). By the Hoeffding bound, assuming that n = Ω(ln(1/δ)) (large enough),
with probability at least 1 − δ we have that 920 · |I| ≤ Z ≤ 1120 · |I|. In addition, by the properties
of the Binomial distribution, for every 920 · |I| ≤ z ≤ 1120 · |I| we have that
Pr[Z = z]
Pr[Z = z + 1]
=
2−|I| · (|I|z )
2−|I| · ( |I|z+1) =
z + 1
|I| − z ∈ e
±1.
Let us denote the number of occurrences of x∗ at the output of the shuffle during the two executions
as |S2| and |S′2|, respectively. So |S2| ≡ k + Z and |S′2| ≡ k − 1 + Z. Fix a set F ⊆ [n] of possible
values for |S2|, and denote
T = {(f − k) : f ∈ F} and T ′ = {(f − k + 1) : f ∈ F}
We have that
Pr [|S2| ∈ F ] = Pr[Z ∈ T ] ≤ δ +Pr
[
Z ∈ T ∩
{
z :
9|I|
20
≤ z ≤ 11|I|
20
}]
≤ δ + e1 · Pr
[
Z − 1 ∈ T ∩
{
z :
9|I|
20
≤ z ≤ 11|I|
20
}]
≤ δ + e1 · Pr [Z − 1 ∈ T ] = δ + e1 · Pr [Z ∈ T ′] = δ + e1 · Pr [∣∣S′2∣∣ ∈ F ] .
A similar analysis shows that Pr [|S′2| ∈ F ] ≤ δ+ e1 ·Pr [|S2| ∈ F ]. This shows that conditioned on
an output of the public channel s1 such that D(·) is accurate for x, we have that
(h, rC ,xC , s1, S2) ≈(1,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , s1, S
′
2
)
.
So far, we have established that the outcome of the first round (that uses the public channel)
preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy, and, conditioned on the outcome of the first round being “good”
19
(i.e., the resulting data structure D is accurate) we have that the outcome of the second round (that
uses the shuffle) preserves (1, δ)-differential privacy. Intuitively, we now want to use composition
theorems for differential privacy to show that the two rounds together satisfy differential privacy.
A small technical issue that we need to handle, though, is that the privacy guarantees of the second
round depend on the success of the first round. As the outcome of the first round is “good” with
overwhelming probability, this technical issue can easily be resolved, as follows.
Consider two random variables S˜1 and S˜′1 that are identical to S1 and S
′
1, except that if the
resulting data structure D(·) is not accurate, then the value is replaced such that the resulting data
structure D(·) is exactly correct. Since the protocol for histograms fails with probability at most
δ, we have that(
h, rC ,xC , S˜1
)
≈(0,δ) (h, rC ,xC , S1) ≈(ε,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , S
′
1
) ≈(0,δ) (h, rC ,xC , S˜′1) .
In words, consider an imaginary protocol in which the outcome distribution of the first round during
the two executions is replaced by S˜1 and S˜′1, respectively. The statistical distance between the
outcome distribution of this imaginary protocol and the original protocol is at most δ. In addition,
for every possible fixture of the outcome of the first (imaginary) round we have the second round
preserves differential privacy. Therefore, composition theorems for differential privacy show that
the two rounds together satisfy differential privacy. Formally,
ViewΠC (x) = (h, rC ,xC , S1, S2) ≈(0,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , S˜1, S2
)
≈(1+ε,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , S˜′1, S
′
2
)
≈(0,δ)
(
h, rC ,xC , S
′
1, S
′
2
)
= ViewΠC (x
′).
Lemma 4.8. Protocol CommonTwoRound solves the common element problem.
Proof. Fix an input vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n such that for every i we have xi = x. By the
utility guarantees of the locally-private protocol for histograms, with probability at least 1 − δ it
holds that all of the estimates given by D(·) are accurate to within ±0.01n. In that case, we have
that y∗ (defined in Step (3)) satisfies y∗ = h(x). Thus, every message submitted to the shuffle
in the second round is equal to x with probability 1/2, and otherwise equal to ⊥. Therefore, the
analyzer fails to output x in Step (6) only if all of the parties submitted ⊥ to the shuffle. This
happens with probability at most 2−n. Overall, with probability at least (1− δ− 2−n) the analyzer
outputs x.
Theorem 4.6 now follows by combining Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8.
5 Possibility and Impossibility for the Nested Common Element
Problem
In this section we define a nested version of the common element problem of Definition 4.1. This
problem has a parameter 0 < α < 1. We show that this problem cannot be solved in the shuffle
model in one round with differential privacy against coalitions of size αn (regardless of the number
of messages each party can send). In contrast, we show that it can be solved with differential
privacy in one round against coalitions of size cn for any constant c < min {α, 1− α} and in two
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rounds against coalitions of size cn for any constant c < 1. The impossibility result for one round
and the two round protocol imply a strong separation between what can be solved in one round
and in two rounds.
Definition 5.1 (The nested common element problem with parameter α). Let 0 < α < 1. Consider
n parties P1, . . . , Pn and an analyzer P0 (as in Remark 2.8). The input of each party in P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋
is an element xi ∈ X and the input of each party P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn is a vector yi of |X | elements
from some finite domain Y. The analyzer P0 has no input. If all inputs of P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋ are equal
(i.e., x1 = x2 = · · · = x⌊αn⌋) and the x1-th coordinate in all inputs of P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn are equal
(i.e., y⌊αn⌋+1[x1] = y⌊αn⌋+2[x1] = · · · = yn[x1]), then the analyzer P0 must output y⌊αn⌋+1[x1]
with probability at least 3/4. The output is not restricted otherwise.
Remark 5.2. When |X | = poly(n) and |Y| is at most exponential in n, then the length of the
inputs of all parties is polynomial in n. Our impossibility result for the nested common element
problem holds in this regime (specifically, when |X | = Ω˜(n2) and |Y| = 2). Our protocols are
correct and private regardless of the size of X and Y.
In this section, we prove the following three theorems.
Theorem 5.3. Let |X | = Ω˜(n2). There is no one-round (1, o(1/n))-differentially private protocol
in the shuffle model against coalition of size ⌊αn⌋ for the nested common element problem with
parameter α (regardless of the number of messages each party can send).
Theorem 5.4. For every 0 < c < 1, ε, δ ∈ [0, 1], and n ≥ 200(1−c)n ln 4δ there exists a two-round (ε, δ)-
differentially private protocol against coalitions of size cn that with probability at least 1 − 1/2n−1
solves the nested common element problem with parameter α.
Theorem 5.5. For every constants c, α such that 0 < c < min {α, 1 − α} < 1, there exists a
constant ε0 such that there exits a one-round (ε0, δ)-differentially private protocol against coalitions
of size cn that with probability at least 3/4 solves the nested common element problem with parameter
α, where δ = 2−O(min{α,1−α}−c)n) and n ≥ 6 ·max {1/α, 1/(1 − α)}.
5.1 An impossibility result for private one-round protocols for the nested com-
mon element problem
We next show that the nested common element problem with parameter α cannot be solved privately
against coalitions of size αn when X is large enough, namely, when |X | = Ω˜(n2). The proof of the
impossibility result is done by using an impossibility result to the vector common element problem
(in the centralized model) defined below.
Definition 5.6 (The vector common element problem). The input of the problem is a database
containing n vectors (y1, . . . ,yn) ∈ ({0, 1}d)n. For a given set of vectors y1, . . . ,yn, define for
every b ∈ {0, 1}
Ib = {j : y1[j] = · · · = yn[j] = b} .
To solve the the vector common element problem, an analyzer must output with probability at least
1− o(1/n) sets J0 and J1 such that I0 ⊆ J0, I1 ⊆ J1, and J0 ∩ J1 = ∅.
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In words, the task in the vector common element problem is to identify the coordinates in which
the inputs vectors agree, that is, for each coordinate if all the vectors agree on the value of the
coordinate then the algorithm should return this coordinate and the common value; if the vectors
do not agree on this coordinate then the algorithm can say that this is either a zero-coordinate, a
one-coordinate, or none of the above.
The following theorem is implied by the techniques of [13] (i.e., the reduction to fingerprinting
codes).
Theorem 5.7 ([13]). For every d ∈ N, any (1, o(1/n))-differentially private algorithm in the cen-
tralized model for the vector common element problem with vectors of length d has sample complexity
Ω˜(
√
d).
We next prove our impossibility result, i.e., prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We show that if for |X | = Ω˜(n2) there is an n-party protocol, denoted Π,
in the shuffle model for the nested common element problem with parameter α that is private
against the coalition of parties holding the x-inputs, namely, C = {P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋}, then there is an
algorithm in the centralized model for the vector common element problem with database of size
O(n2 log n) violating Theorem 5.7.
As a first step, consider the following algorithm A1 for the vector common element problem in
the centralized model, whose inputs are y⌊αn⌋+1, . . . ,yn (each vector of length |X |).
1. The analyzer chooses a public random string w.
2. For each i ∈ {⌊αn⌋+ 1, . . . , n}, the analyzer simulates party Pi in protocol Π with the input
yi and the public random string w, generating a vector of messages mi.
3. The analyzer shuffles the messages in m⌊αn⌋+1, · · · ,mn, denote the output of the shuffle by
m˜.
4. For every x ∈ X do:
(a) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊αn⌋}, the analyzer simulates party Pi in protocol Π with the input
x and the public random string w, generating a vector of messages mi.
(b) The analyzer shuffles the messages in m˜,m1, . . . ,m⌊αn⌋, gives the shuffled messages to
the analyzer of Π, and gets an output zx.
5. The analyzer returns Ib = {x : zx = b} for b ∈ {0, 1}.
First we argue that A1 is (1, o(1/n))-differentially private: The coalition C sees the output of
the shuffle in Π and can remove the messages it sent to the shuffle in Π, therefore computing m˜
from the view is a post-processing of an (ε, o(1/n))-differentially private output. Second, notice
that for every x ∈ X , the shuffled messages that the analyzer of Π gets in Step (4b) are distributed
as in Π, thus, if y⌊αn⌋+1[x] = · · · = yn[x] = b, then zx = b with probability at least 3/4 (however
for x 6= x′ these events might be independent).
The success probability of A1 is not enough to violate Theorem 5.3 and we repeat it O(log |X |)
times. This is done in A2, which preserves the privacy using sub-sampling:
1. Inputs: vectors y1, . . . ,yt, where t = O(n ln |X |).
22
2. For ℓ = 1 to 4 ln |X | do:
(a) Sample a set T ⊂ [t] of size t(3+exp(1))4 ln |X | = n and execute A1 on the vectors (yi)i∈T
and get sets Jℓ0, J
ℓ
1 .
3. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let Jb =
{
j : j ∈ Jℓb for more than 4 ln |X | indices ℓ
}
.
By Theorem B.3 (i.e., sub-sampling) and since A1 is (1, o( 1n ))-differentially private, each execution
of Step (2a) is ( 14 ln |X | , o(
1
n ln |X |))-differentially private. By simple composition, algorithm A2 is
(1, o(1/n))-differentially private.
We next argue that with probability at least 1 − o(1/n) algorithm A2 outputs disjoint sets
J0, J1 such that I0 ⊆ J0 and I1 ⊆ J1. Fix j such that y1[j] = · · · = yt[j] = b for some b. By the
correctness of A1, for every ℓ ∈ [4 ln |X |] it holds that j ∈ Jℓb with probability at least 3/4 and these
events are independent. Thus, by the Hoeffding inequality, j ∈ Jℓb for more than half of the values
of ℓ with probability at least 1 − 1/|X |2. By the union bound, the probability that the algorithm
errs for some coordinate for which all vectors yi agree is at most 1/|X | = O˜(1/n2) = o(1/n).
To conclude, assuming that Π as above exits, we constructed a (1, o(1/n))-differentially private
algorithm A2 with database of size O(n2 log n) and d = |X | = Ω˜(|X |2), contradicting Theorem 5.7.
5.2 Private protocols for the nested common element problem
5.2.1 Prelude
As a warm-up, we present Protocol CommonPrelude (described in Figure 6), a new protocol for
the common element problem of Definition 4.1, i.e., there are n parties, each holding an element
xi. If x1 = · · · = xn, then the analyzer must output x1. (There are more efficient protocols for this
problem.) We then present Protocol NestedCommonElement (described in Figure 7), which
generalizes Protocol CommonPrelude to the nested functionality and we use the proof of privacy
of the former protocol to prove the privacy of the latter protocol.
Lemma 5.8. Let c < 1 be a constant and G be a group with at least 16|X | elements. There exists
a constant ε0 = O(ln
1
1−c) such that for every n > 2 Protocol CommonPrelude is an (ε0, δ)-
differentially private protocol against coalitions of size cn that solves the common element problem
with probability at least 3/4, where δ = O(e−(1−c)n/8).
Proof. We first prove the correctness of the protocol; we only need to consider the case when
x1 = · · · = xn. We say that if any party executes Step (2(a)ii), then the protocol fails. By the
union bound, the probability of this event is at most 1/8. If this event does not occur, then z[x1] = 0
and the protocol fails if there is a x 6= x1 such that z[x] = 0. This can happen in two cases: (1)
no party participates – this occurs with probability 4−n, which is less than 1/16 for n ≥ 2. (2) the
sum of all random elements in some coordinate is 0. This occurs with probability at most |X |/|G|.
As G is a group with at least 16|X | elements, the last probability is less than 1/16. All together
the probability of failure is less than 1/4.
We next provide the privacy analysis. We assume an ideal functionality for addition, that is,
the parties in a coalition C only see the sum z and (zi)Pi∈C . We use a statistically-secure protocol
for addition in the shuffle model. By Lemma 2.12, this statistical security will add to the δ in the
(ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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Protocol CommonPrelude
1. Let G be any additive group such that |G| ≥ 16|X |.
2. Each party Pi prepares a vector zi of length |X | of elements from G as follows:
(a) With probability 3/4 (party Pi participates):
i. For every x 6= xi let zi[x] be a random element in G independently chosen
with uniform distribution.
ii. With probability 1/6n (sets location xi to noise): Let zi[xi] be a random
element in G independently chosen with uniform distribution.
iii. With probability 1− 16n (sets location xi to zero): Let zi[xi] = 0.
(b) With probability 1/4 (party Pi does not participate): For every x ∈ X let
zi[x] = 0.
3. The parties execute the δ′-secure protocol of Theorem B.4 for addition over G|X | in
the shuffle model where the input of Pi is zi. Let z be the sum.
4. If there is a unique coordinate x such that z[x] = 0, then the analyzer outputs x.
Figure 6: A one-round protocol in the shuffle model against coalitions of size at most cn for the
common element problem (for some constant c < 1).
Let C be a coalition of size cn. W.l.o.g., assume that C = {P(1−c)n+1, . . . , Pn} and consider two
databases that differ on x1. Let n
′ = (1 − c)n and z′ = ∑n′i=1 zi. Note that the coalition C can
compute z′, but has no information on (zi)1≤i≤n′ . We say that a party Pi ∈ C does not participate
in the protocol if it executes Step (2b), otherwise we say that it participates. We start with two
observations:
• The probability that more than 1/2 of the parties in C do not participate is less than e−n′/8
(by the Hoeffding bound). In this case privacy may fail, and this will fall under the δ in the
definition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
• If the parties in {P2, . . . , Pn′} that participate do not hold the same value x, then the output
z′ is a uniformly random vector, regardless of P1s action (and input), and privacy holds.
In the rest of the proof we assume that the above two events do not hold and fix the set of parties
T ⊆ {P2, . . . , Pn′} that participate (this set is of size at least n′/2). The only two possible cases
for the output: (1) a random vector z′ and (2) a vector z′ in which z′[x] = 0 and all coordinates
except for z′[x] are random. We show that the probabilities of both possible cases for the output
are bigger than some constant 0 < p < 1 when x1 = x and when x1 6= x. The probability that at
least one party in T executes Step (2(a)ii) is at least
1− (1− 1/6n)|T | ≥ 1− (1− 1/6n)n′/2 ≈ 1− e−(1−c)/12 ≈ 1− c
12
(regardless of the input of P1); in this case z
′ is a uniformly random vector. Otherwise, if P1 does
not participate, the output is z′[x] = 0 (even if x1 6= x). The probability that no party in T executes
Step (2(a)ii) is (1− 1/6n)|T | ≥ (1− 1/6n)n′ ≈ e−(1−c)/6 ≈ 1− 1−c6 ≥ 56 . Thus, the probability that
no party in T executes Step (2(a)ii) and P1 does not participate is at least 5/6 · 1/4 = 5/24.
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5.2.2 A private one-round protocol for the nested common element problem
We next present for every constant c < min {α, 1− α}, a protocol, called Protocol NestedCom-
monElement, for the nested common element problem with parameter α that is private for coali-
tions of size cn. A possible idea to construct such protocol is to execute Protocol CommonPrelude
for every coordinate yi[x] of the vectors. The problem with this idea is that the analyzer will learn
the values of yi for all coordinates the vectors agree. By the proof of Theorem 5.3 this is impos-
sible (when X is big). The solution is that each party Pi that holds an input xi adds noise for
every x 6= xi (that is, with probability 1 it sends a random vector in the execution of Protocol
CommonPrelude for coordinate x). Similar to Protocol CommonPrelude, with some small
probability it has to add noise also to the execution of Protocol CommonPrelude for coordinate
xi. In Lemma 5.9, we prove the correctness and privacy of Protocol NestedCommonElement,
proving Theorem 5.5.
Lemma 5.9. Let G be a group with at least 16|X | · |Y| elements. For every constants c, α such
that 0 < c < min {α, 1 − α} < 1, there exists a constant ε0 > 1 such that for every n ≥
6 · max {1/α, 1/(1 − α)} Protocol NestedCommonElement is a one-round (ε0, δ)-differentially
private protocol against coalitions of size cn that with probability at least 3/4 solves the nested
common element problem with parameter α, where δ = O
(
2(min{α,1−α}−c)n
)
.
Proof. We first prove the correctness of Protocol NestedCommonElement (similar to the cor-
rectness of Protocol CommonPrelude); we only need to consider the case when x1 = · · · = x⌊αn⌋
and y⌊αn⌋+1[x1] = . . . = yn[x1] (there are no correctness requirements if these condition do not
hold). We say that if any party executes Step (2(a)ii) or Step (3(a)ii), then the protocol fails. By
the union bound, the probability of this event is at most 1/8. If this event does not occur, then
z[x1,y1[x1]] = 0. In this case the protocol fails if there is a x, y 6= x1,y1[x1] such that z[x, y] = 0.
This can happen in two cases: (1) no x-party participates or no y-party participates – this occurs
with probability 4−αn + 4−(1−α)n, which is less than 1/16 for n ≥ 6 · max {1/α, 1/(1 − α)}. (2)
the sum of all random elements in some coordinate is 0. This occurs with probability at most
|X ||Y|/|G|. As G is a group with at least 16|X | · |Y| elements, the last probability is less than 1/16.
All together the probability of failure is less than 1/4.
We next prove the privacy. Again, we assume an ideal functionality for addition and consider
two neighboring databases. Let C be a coalition of size cn and z′ = ∑i:Pi /∈C . If there is no
party in
{
P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋
} \ C (i.e., an honest x-party) that participates or there is no party in{
P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn
} \ C (i.e., an honest y-party) that participates (which occurs with probability
4−(α−c)n+4−(1−α−c)n), then we say that the privacy fails and we pay for it in the δ. There are two
cases.
• There exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊αn⌋ such that xi 6= x′i. In this case (zi)i:Pi /∈C are simply vectors
that (Pi)i:Pi /∈C send to the shuffle in an execution of Protocol CommonPrelude over the
group G|Y|, and the privacy follows from Lemma 5.8. Note that in the proof of Lemma 5.8
we only need the following properties: (1) at least one of the parties from
{
P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋
} \ C
participates, and (2) each party not in C sends a random vector with probability 1/8 and
this is true in Protocol NestedCommonElement regardless if the party is an x-party or a
y-party.
• There exists an ⌊αn⌋ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that yi 6= y′i. We assumed that there is at least
one honest x-party that participates. If there are two honest x-parties that participate with
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Protocol NestedCommonElement
1. Let G be any additive group such that |G| ≥ 16|X ||Y|.
2. Each party Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊αn⌋ prepares a vector zi of length |X | · |Y| of elements
from G as follows:
(a) With probability 3/4 (party Pi participates):
i. For every x 6= xi and y ∈ Y let zi[x, y] be a random element in G indepen-
dently chosen with uniform distribution.
ii. With probability 1/6n (sets xi-locations to noise): For every y ∈ Y let
zi[xi, y] be a random element in G independently chosen with uniform dis-
tribution.
iii. With probability 1 − 1/6n (sets xi-locations to zero): For every y ∈ Y let
zi[xi, y] = 0.
(b) With probability 1/4 (party Pi does not participate): For every x ∈ X let
zi[x] = 0.
3. Each party Pi for ⌊αn⌋+1 ≤ i ≤ n prepares a vector zi of length |X | · |Y| of elements
from G as follows:
(a) With probability 3/4 (party Pi participates):
i. For every x ∈ X and every y 6= yi[x] let zi[x, y] be a random element in G
independently chosen with uniform distribution.
ii. With probability 1/6n (sets yi-locations to noise): For every x ∈ X , let
zi[x,yi[x]] be a random element in G independently chosen with uniform
distribution.
iii. With probability 1 − 1/6n (sets yi-locations to zero): For every x ∈ X , let
zi[x,yi[x]] = 0.
(b) With probability 1/4 (party Pi does not participate): For every x ∈ X let
zi[x] = 0.
4. The parties execute the δ′-secure protocol of Theorem B.4 for addition over G|X | in
the shuffle model where the input of Pi is zi. Let z be the sum.
5. If there is a unique coordinate x such that z[x, y] = 0, then the analyzer outputs y.
Figure 7: A one-round protocol in the shuffle model for the nested common element problem.
26
a different input, then z′ is a random vector regardless of the input of Pi. Otherwise, let
Pi′ be an honest x-party that participates. Then, all coordinates z[x, y], where x 6= xi are
random elements. In this case we can ignore all entries in the vector z′[x′, y], where x′ 6= x
and effectively the view of C is the view in an execution of Protocol CommonPrelude over
the group G|Y|, and the privacy follows from Lemma 5.8 (since we assumed that there is at
least one honest y-party that participates).
Remark 5.10. In Protocol NestedCommonElement (as well as Protocol CommonPrelude)
the privacy parameter is ε0 > 1. Using sub-sampling (Theorem B.3) we can reduce the privacy
parameter to any ε by increasing the number of parties by a multiplicative factor of O(1/ε). Notice
that this is possible in Protocol NestedCommonElement since it only uses the shuffle and all
x-parties (respectively, all y-parties) are symmetric.
5.2.3 A private two-round protocol for the nested common element problem
We next present a two-round differentially private protocol for the nested common element problem
against a coalition of size cn for every c < 1. In our protocol we will need a one-round protocol for a
variant common element problem, called the α-common element problem, where only P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋
hold inputs, that is, if x1 = x2 = · · · = x⌊αn⌋, then with probability at least 3/4 the analyzer must
output x1. Of course, P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋ can execute Protocol CommonPrelude to solve this problem,
however the protocol will be private only against coalitions of size cn, where c < α. To achieve
this goal, we use a protocol of Balcer and Cheu [2] for histograms, which reports all elements that
appear frequently in a database, and in particular, the α-common element. The properties of the
protocol are summarized in Theorem 5.11. Note that coalitions are not onsidered in [2], however
the view of a coalition of size cn in this protocol is basically the view of the analyzer in a protocol
with (1−c)n parties, hence the security of their protocol against coalitions follows (taking a slightly
bigger ε).
Theorem 5.11 (Special case of [2, Theorem 12]). For every c < 1, ε, δ ∈ [0, 1], and n ≥ 200(1−c)n ln 4δ
there is a one-round (ε, δ)-differentially private protocol against coalitions of size cn that solves
the α-common element problem with probability at least 1 − 1/2n. The message complexity of this
protocol is O(|X |).
We next prove the existence of a two round protocol for the nested common element problem,
proving Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The protocol is the natural protocol. We first execute the α-common ele-
ment problem to find the value x that is common among the parties P1, . . . , P⌊αn⌋ (assuming such
value exists). If the protocol returns some value x0, then in the second round we execute the (1−α)-
common element problem to find the value y that is common among the parties P⌊αn⌋+1, . . . , Pn
when holding the elements y⌊αn⌋+1[x0], . . . ,yn[x0] (assuming such value exists). If this protocol
returns a value y0, then return this value.
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A Preliminaries from Information Theory
We recall basic definitions from information theory. The following definition was introduced by
Shannon as a measure for the uncertainty in a random variable.
Definition A.1 (Entropy). The entropy of a random variable X is
H(X) = −
∑
x
Pr[X = x] · log (Pr[X = x]) .
The joint entropy of (jointly distributed) random variables X and Y is
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x,y
Pr[X = x, Y = y] · log (Pr[X = x, Y = y]) .
Note that this is simply the entropy of the random variable Z = (X,Y ).
Remark A.2. Observe that, by definition, we have that
H(X) = −E
X
[
log(Pr[X = x])
]
and H(X,Y ) = − E
(X,Y )
[
log(Pr[X = x, Y = y])
]
.
We will use the following bounds on the entropy of a binary random variable.
Claim A.3. Let X be a random variable such that Pr[X = 1] = p and Pr[X = 0] = 1− p for some
p ∈ [0, 1]. Then
p · log 1
p
≤ H(X) ≤ p · log 4
p
.
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Proof. The lower bound is immediate from the definition of H(X). The upper bound follows from
the fact that for every x ∈ [0, 1] it holds that −(1− x) log(1− x) ≤ 2x. Specifically,
H(X) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p) ≤ −p log(p) + 2p = p · log 4
p
.
The following definition can be used to measure the uncertainty in one random variable condi-
tioned on another.
Definition A.4 (Conditional entropy). Let X,Y be two random variables. The conditional entropy
of X given Y is
H(X|Y ) = E
Y
[
H(X|Y = y)
]
,
where
H(X|Y = y) = −
∑
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y] · log (Pr[X = x|Y = y]) .
Similarly, given another random variable Z, we have that
H(X|Y,Z = z) = E
Y |Z=z
[
H(X|Y = y, Z = z)
]
.
Remark A.5. Observe that
H(X|Y ) = E
Y
[
H(X|Y = y)
]
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y] ·H(X|Y = y)
= −
∑
y
Pr[Y = y] ·
∑
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y] · log(Pr[X = x|Y = y])
= −
∑
x,y
Pr[X = x, Y = y] · log(Pr[X = x|Y = y])
= − E
(X,Y )
log(Pr[X = x|Y = y]).
Consider two random variables X and Y . The following Claim shows that, intuitively, the
uncertainty in (X,Y ) is the uncertainty in X plus the uncertainty in Y given X.
Claim A.6 (Chain rule of conditional entropy). Let X,Y be two random variables. Then,
H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X).
Proof. For every x, y we have that
Pr[X = x, Y = y] = Pr[X = x] · Pr[Y = y|X = x],
and hence,
log(Pr[X = x, Y = y]) = log(Pr[X = x]) + log(Pr[Y = y|X = x]).
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Taking the expectation over X and Y we get that
E
(X,Y )
[
log(Pr[X = x, Y = y])
]
= E
X
[
log(Pr[X = x])
]
+ E
(X,Y )
[
log(Pr[Y = y|X = x])
]
.
Therefore, by Remarks A.2 and A.5 we have that
H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X).
Consider two random variables X and Y . The following definition can be used to measure the
amount of “information” that X gives on Y .
Definition A.7 (Mutual information). Let X,Y be two random variables. The mutual information
of X and Y is
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
Remark A.8. Observe that by the chain rule of conditional entropy (Claim A.6), we get that the
mutual information that X gives about Y equals the mutual information that Y gives about X.
Formally,
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(X)−H(X,Y ) +H(Y )
= −H(Y |X) +H(Y )
= I(Y ;X).
Claim A.9. Let X and Y be random variables. Then,
0 ≤ I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X).
The following definition can be used to measure the amount of “information” that X gives on
Y , conditioned on a third random variable Z.
Definition A.10 (Conditional mutual information). Let X,Y,Z be three random variables. The
conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z = z is
I(X;Y |Z = z) = H(X|Z = z)−H(X|Y,Z = z)
The conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is
I(X;Y |Z) = E
Z
[
I(X;Y |Z = z)
]
.
The following claim gives an alternative definition for conditional mutual information.
Claim A.11.
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z).
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Proof.
I(X;Y |Z) = E
Z
[
I(X;Y |Z = z)
]
= E
Z
[
H(X|Z = z)
]
− E
Z
[
H(X|Y,Z = z)
]
= H(X|Z)− E
Z
[
E
Y |Z=z
[
H(X|Y = y, Z = z)
]]
= H(X|Z)− E
(Y,Z)
[
H(X|Y = y, Z = z)
]
= H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z).
Claim A.12 (Chain rule for mutual information).
I(X,Y ;Z) = I(X;Z) + I(Y ;Z|X).
Proof. Using the chain rule for conditional entropy (Claim A.6) we get that
I(X,Y ;Z) = H(X,Y )−H(X,Y |Z)
= H(X) +H(Y |X)−H(X|Z)−H(Y |X,Z)
= I(X;Z) + I(Y ;Z|X).
Consider three random variables Y1, Y2, Z, where Y1 and Y2 are conditionally independent given
Z. That is, for every y1, y2, z such that Pr[Z = z] > 0 we have
Pr[Y1 = y1 ∧ Y2 = y2|Z = z] = Pr[Y1 = y1|Z = z] · Pr[Y2 = y2|Z = z].
The following lemma shows that the amount of information that (Y1, Y2) give about Z, is at most
the amount that Y1 gives on Z plus the amount that Y2 gives on Z. (This is not necessarily true
without the conditionally independent assumption.)
Lemma A.13. Let Y1, Y2, Z be random variables, where Y1 and Y2 are conditionally independent
given Z. Then,
I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2) ≥ I(Z;Y1, Y2).
Proof. By repeated application of the chain rule of mutual information (Claim A.12), it holds
I(Z;Y1, Y2) = I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2|Y1)
= I(Z;Y1) + I(Z, Y1;Y2)− I(Y1;Y2)
= I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2) + I(Y1;Y2|Z)− I(Y1;Y2)
= I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2)− I(Y1;Y2)
≤ I(Z;Y1) + I(Z;Y2),
where the last equality follows since I(Y1;Y2|Z) = 0 as Y1 and Y2 are conditionally independent.
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The following lemma shows that if I(X;Y |Z) is high and if H(Z) is low, then I(X;Y ) must
also be high. That is, if X gives a lot of information on Y when conditioning on a random variable
Z with low entropy, then X gives a lot of information on Y even without conditioning on Z.
Lemma A.14. Let X,Y,Z be three random variables. Then,
I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Y |Z)−H(Z).
Proof. As in the previous proof, using the chain rule of mutual information (Claim A.12) we have
that
I(Z;X,Y ) = I(Z;X) + I(Z;Y |X)
= I(Z;X) + I(Z,X;Y )− I(X;Y )
= I(Z;X) + I(Z;Y ) + I(X;Y |Z)− I(X;Y ).
Therefore,
I(X;Y ) = I(Z;X) + I(Z;Y ) + I(X;Y |Z)− I(Z;X,Y )
≥ I(X;Y |Z)− I(Z;X,Y )
≥ I(X;Y |Z)− I(Z;Z)
= I(X;Y |Z)−H(Z).
B Additional Preliminaries from Differential Privacy
The following theorem bounds the mutual information between the input and the output of a
differentially private algorithm (that operates on a database of size 1).
Theorem B.1 ([8]). Let X be uniformly distributed over X . Let A be an (ε, δ)-differentially private
algorithm that operates on a single input (i.e., a database of size 1) from X . Let Z denote A(X).
Then,
I(X;Z) = O
(
ε2 +
δ
ε
log |X |+ δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
.
In our protocols we will use the following protocol in the local model for computing histograms.
Theorem B.2 (Histogram protocol [8, 7, 12]). Let β, ε ≤ 1 and X be some finite domain. There
exists a 1-round (ε, 0)-differentially private protocol in the local model for n parties with message
complexity 1, in which the input of each agent is a single element from X and the outcome is a
data structure D : X → [n] such that for every input to the protocol x ∈ X n, with probability at
least 1− β, for every input vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X we have∣∣∣ D(x)− |{i : xi = x}| ∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
n · log
( |X |
β
))
.
We next recall the sub-sampling technique from [26, 9].
Theorem B.3 (Sub-sampling [26, 9]). Let A1 be an (ε∗, δ)-differentially private algorithm operating
on databases of size n. Fix ε ≤ 1, and denote t = nε (3 + exp(ε∗)). Construct an algorithm A2 that
on input a database D = (zi)
t
i=1 uniformly at random selects a subset T ⊆ {1, 2, ..., t} of size n,
and runs A1 on the multiset DT = (zi)i∈T . Then, A2 is
(
ε, 4ε3+exp(ε∗)δ
)
-differentially private.
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Secure addition protocols in the shuffle model. Ishai et al. [25] gave a protocol where n ≥ 2
parties communicate with an analyzer (as in Remark 2.8) to compute the sum of their inputs
in a finite group G, in the semi-honest setting and in the presence of a coalition including the
analyzer and up to n− 1 parties. In their protocol, each participating party splits their input into
ℓ = O(log |G| + log n + σ) shares and sends each share in a separate message through the shuffle.
Upon receiving the nℓ shuffled messages, the analyzer adds them up (in G) to compute the sum.
Recent work by Ghazi et al. [22] and Balle et al. [6] improved the dependency of the number of
messages on the number of participating parties to ℓ = O (1 + (log |G|+ σ)/ log n).
Theorem B.4 ([25, 22, 6]). Let G be a finite group. There exist a one-round shuffle model sum-
mation protocol with n parties holding inputs xi ∈ G and an analyzer. The protocol is secure in the
semi-honest model, and in the presence of coalitions including the analyzer and up to n− 1 parties.
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